Single-timescale distributed GNE seeking for aggregative games over
  networks via forward-backward operator splitting by Gadjov, Dian & Pavel, Lacra
1Single-timescale distributed GNE seeking for aggregative games over
networks via forward-backward operator splitting
Dian Gadjov and Lacra Pavel
Abstract— We consider aggregative games with affine coupling
constraints, where agents have partial information on the aggre-
gate value and can only communicate with neighbouring agents.
We propose a single-layer distributed algorithm that reaches a vari-
ational generalized Nash equilibrium, under constant step sizes.
The algorithm works on a single timescale, i.e., does not require
multiple communication rounds between agents before updating
their action. The convergence proof leverages an invariance prop-
erty of the aggregate estimates and relies on a forward-backward
splitting for two preconditioned operators and their restricted
(strong) monotonicity properties on the consensus subspace.
I. INTRODUCTION
Research in aggregative games has surged in recent years, due to
their suitability to model decision problems in various application
domains: from demand-side management for the smart grid, [1] and
electric vehicles, [2], to network congestion control, [3]. Aggregative
games are non-cooperative games in which each (player’s) agent’s
cost depends on some aggregate effect of all other agents’ actions.
Often agents have shared coupling constraints, and the relevant
equilibrium concept is the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE).
Many settings involve a large number of agents with private cost
functions and constraints, who are willing and able to exchange infor-
mation with their neighbours only, [4], [5]. Motivated by the above,
in this note we develop a single-layer/single-timescale, discrete-time
distributed GNE seeking algorithm for aggregative games, which is
guaranteed to converge exactly to a variational GNE when using
fixed-step sizes. Agents update simultaneously their action and an
aggregate-estimate, based on local communication. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first such algorithm in the literature for
aggregative games. Our novel contributions are to relate the algorithm
to a preconditioned forward-backward splitting of a pair of monotone
operators, and develop conditions for distributed convergence.
Literature Review: The problem of finding a (generalized) Nash
Equilibrium (G)NE when agents know the actions of all other agents
(full-decision information) has been studied thoroughly, e.g. [6]–[9],
or via a centralized operator-splitting [10]. In recent years, a rapidly
growing field originated by [11], [12] is focused on developing
algorithms that relax this full-information assumption to (G)NE
computation over networks. Fully distributed NE seeking algorithms
have been proposed for general games with decoupled constraints,
either in continuous time, e.g. [13], [14] or in discrete time (with
fixed-step sizes), e.g. [15], or [16] (with fast convergence). However,
these algorithms require each agent to maintain an estimate of the
actions of all other agents, hence are inefficient for aggregative games.
The same holds for the fully distributed GNE seeking algorithm
proposed in [17] for generally coupled games. For aggregative games,
existing algorithms can be classified as semi-decentralized (when
a central coordinator is required), or distributed (when only local
communication is used). Semi-decentralized GNE algorithms have
been proposed for aggregative games in [18]–[21] (discrete-time) and
[22] (continuous-time). An elegant operator theory approach is used
to show that global convergence can be achieved with fixed-step sizes
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under (strict) strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient of the game,
either to a variational generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE), or to an
aggregative (Wardrop) equilibrium (GAE). The algorithms require a
central coordinator to broadcast the aggregate value and to ensure the
coupling constraints are met.
In a distributed setting a central coordinator/node does not exist,
and distributed algorithms are more difficult to develop. For aggrega-
tive games, such distributed algorithms have been mostly developed
for NE seeking with no coupled constraints. The first work to propose
distributed NE algorithms for aggregative games over networks was
[11]. In order to cope with not knowing the aggregate value, each
agent maintains an estimate of the true aggregate, built based on
local communication with neighbours, and uses it in the action update
instead of the true aggregate. The algorithm proposed in [11] requires
diminishing step-sizes for exact convergence, while only guaranteeing
convergence to a neighbourhood of the NE when using fixed-step
sizes, under (strict) strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient of the
game. The recent algorithm proposed in [23] requires an increasing
number of communication rounds before each action update. In both
cases, the NE seeking algorithms effectively operate as if on two
time-scales (fast aggregate estimate, slow action update) with each
agent using an estimate that is near the true aggregate.
Fewer results exist for distributed GNE seeking in aggregative
games with coupled constraints. In fact, the only such distributed
discrete-time algorithm for aggregative games that we are aware of
is the one proposed in [24]. The algorithm requires that players
exchange information for a fixed number of communication rounds
before every action update and is only guaranteed to reach an -GNE.
The -GNE approaches a variational GNE if the fixed number of
communication rounds between action updates goes to infinity, which
is impractical. A continuous-time dynamics for aggregative games
with equality constraints is proposed in [25]. However, convergence
in continuous-time does not guarantee convergence in discrete-time.
Contributions: Motivated by the above, in this paper we propose
a distributed, single-layer discrete-time GNE seeking algorithm for
aggregative games with affine coupling constraints, that has guaran-
teed exact convergence to a variational GNE when using constant
step-sizes. To the best of our knowledge, to date there does not exist
such an algorithm tailored for aggregative games. We note that
the algorithm recently proposed in [17] for generally coupled games
is applicable to aggregative games, but because it does not exploit
the aggregative structure is computationally inefficient when used
for these types of games. In our algorithm, each agent maintains an
estimate of the aggregate and multiplier, and exchanges them with
its neighbours over an undirected static connected graph, in order to
learn the true aggregate value and ensure that the coupling constraints
are satisfied. Each agent updates its action and its aggregate estimates
in the same iteration. Compared to the distributed NE algorithm
in [11], and the GNE algorithm in [24] for aggregative games,
our algorithm does not require diminishing step-sizes nor multiple
communication rounds between each action update. It is related to a
preconditioned forward-backward operator splitting iteration, inspired
by the distributed framework for GNE seeking in general games
conceptualized in [26] for full-decision information, and extended
in [17] to partial-decision information. We note that the algorithm
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2in [17] requires each agent to keep an estimate of all other agents’
actions; if applied to aggregative games where the coupling is only
through the average, this can be not scalable/inefficient.
The distributed algorithm we develop here exploits the aggregative
coupling structure in the cost. Each agent exchanges and maintains
only an estimate of the aggregate (dimensionally independent on
the number of agents, hence scalable) and an estimate of the dual
multiplier. Thus players do not need to share action information,
which might be private information. We use proof techniques similar
to those in [17] with the following differences. The algorithm
is tailored for the special structure of aggregative games. Unlike
[17], here the estimate is a separate variable that needs to track
the aggregate decision. Because of this, the update equation of
the aggregate estimate has an additional correction term. This is
introduced to account for the own action’s effect on the average
and acts as a dynamic-tracking term. Secondly, this correction term
allows us to exploit an invariance property of the aggregate estimate.
This invariance property plays a critical role in ensuring convergence
with fixed-step sizes and in obtaining a better bound compared to the
algorithm in [17]. Thirdly, because of this correction term we need to
use slightly different splitting operators and a different metric matrix,
which needs handled separately. A conference version appears in
[27]; here we provide all proofs and additional numerical results.
Notations. For a vector x ∈ Rm, xT denotes its transpose and
‖x‖ = √〈x | x〉 = √xT x the norm induced by inner product 〈· | ·〉.
For a symmetric positive-definite matrix Φ, Φ  0, λmin(Φ) and
λmax(Φ) denote its minimum and maximum eigenvalues. The Φ-
induced inner product is 〈x | y〉Φ = 〈Φx | y〉 and the Φ-induced
norm, ‖x‖Φ =
√〈Φx | x〉. For a matrix A ∈ Rm×n, let ‖A‖ =
σmax(A) denote the 2-induced matrix norm, where σmax(A) is its
maximum singular value. For N = {1, . . . , N}, col(xi)i∈N denotes
the stacked vector obtained from vectors xi, diag(xi)i∈N is the
diagonal matrix with xi along the diagonal. Null(A) and Range(A)
are the null and range space of matrix A, while [A]ij stands for its
(i, j) entry. In, 1n and 0n denote the identity matrix, the all-ones
and the all-zero vector of dimension n, respectively. We may also
simply use 0 to denote an all-zero matrix of appropriate dimensions.
Denote
∏N
i=1 Ωi as the Cartesian product of sets Ωi, i = 1, . . . , N .
For a function f(x) = f(col(xi)i∈N ) let ∇xif(x) = ∂∂xi f(x).
II. BACKGROUND
Monotone Operators
The following are from [28]. Let A : Rm → 2Rm be a set-valued
operator. The domain of A is domA = {x ∈ Rm | Ax 6= ∅} where
∅ is the empty set, and the range of A is ranA = {y ∈ Rm | ∃x, y ∈
Ax}. The graph of A is graA = {(x, u) ∈ Rm × Rm | u ∈ Ax}.
The zero set of A is zerA = {x ∈ Rm | 0 ∈ Ax}. A is called
monotone if ∀(x, u), ∀(y, v) ∈ graA, 〈x− y | u− v〉 ≥ 0, and
strongly monotone if ∃µ > 0 such that ∀(x, u),∀(y, v) ∈ graA,
〈x− y | u− v〉 ≥ µ ‖x− y‖2. A is maximally monotone if graA
is not strictly contained in the graph of any other monotone operator.
The resolvent of A is JA = (Id + A)−1, where Id is the identity
operator. The fixed points of A are FixA = {x ∈ Rm | x ∈ Ax}.
An operator T : Ω ⊂ Rm → Rm is nonexpansive if
‖T (x)−T (y)‖ ≤ ‖x−y‖ , ∀x,y ∈ Ω. T ∈ A(α), where A(α)
denotes the class of α-averaged operators, if and only if ∀x, y ∈Ω,
‖Tx−Ty‖2≤‖x−y‖2−1−αα ‖(x− y)−(Tx− Ty)‖2. T ∈A( 12 ) is
also called firmly nonexpansive. If A is maximally monotone then
JA is firmly nonexpasive, [ [28], Prop. 23.7]. Let the projection of x
onto Ω be PΩ(x) = arg miny∈Ω ‖x−y‖, with PΩ(x) =JNΩ(x) =
(Id+NΩ)
−1, where NΩ(x) = {v | 〈v | y−x〉 ≤ 0,∀y ∈ Ω} is the
normal cone. If Ω is closed and convex, PΩ is firmly nonexpansive
[ [28], Prop. 4.8]. T is called β-cocoercive if βT ∈A( 12 ) for β>0,
i.e., β ‖Tx− Ty‖2≤〈x− y | Tx−Ty〉 ∀x, y∈Ω.
Graph Theory
Let graph G = (N , E) describe the information exchange among a
set N of agents, where E ⊂ N ×N is the edge set. If agent i can get
information from agent j, then (j, i) ∈ E and agent j belongs to agent
i’s neighbour setNi = {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. G is undirected when (i, j) ∈
E if and only if (j, i) ∈ E . G is connected if there is a path between
any two nodes. Let W = [wij ] ∈ RN×N be the weighted adjacency
matrix, with wij > 0 if j ∈ Ni and wij = 0 otherwise. Let Deg =
diag(di)i∈N , where di =
∑N
j=1 wij . Assume that W = W
T so the
weighted Laplacian of G is L = Deg−W . When G is connected and
undirected, 0 is a simple eigenvalue of L, L1N = 0N , 1
T
NL = 0
T
N .
All other eigenvalues of L are positive, ordered in ascending order
as 0 < λ2(L) ≤ · · · ≤ λN (L), with d∗ ≤ λN (L) ≤ 2d∗, where
d∗ = maxi di is the maximal weighted degree of G.
III. GAME FORMULATION
Consider a group of agents (players) N = {1, . . . , N}, where
each player i ∈ N controls its local decision (action/strategy)
xi ∈ Rn. Denote x = col(xi)i∈N ∈ RNn as the decision profile
of all agents. Equivalently, we also write x = (xi, x−i) where
x−i = col(. . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . ) denotes the decision profile of all
agents except player i. Agent i aims to optimize its objective function
J¯i(xi, x−i) (coupled to other players’ decisions) with respect to its
own decision xi over its feasible decision set Ωi. Let the globally
shared, affine coupled constrained set be
K=
N∏
i=1
Ωi ∩ {x ∈ Rn |
N∑
i=1
Aixi ≤
N∑
i=1
bi}
where Ωi ⊂ Rn is a private feasible set of player i, and Ai ∈ Rm×n,
bi ∈ Rm is local player information. Let Ω =
∏N
i=1 Ωi.
We focus on average aggregative games where the cost function
J¯i(xi, x−i) of each agent i depends on the average of all agents’
actions σ(x) = 1N
∑N
j=1 xj ∈ Rn, denoted as J¯i(xi, x−i) =
Ji(xi, σ(x)) to explictly indicate this dependency. In the remainder
of the paper we use either J¯i or Ji, depending on the context. Given
the other’s actions x−i, the objective of each player i is to solve the
following optimization problem with coupled constraints,
min
xi
, J¯i(xi, x−i) s.t. (xi, x−i) ∈ K (1)
A generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is x∗=col(x∗i)i∈N such that
(∀i ∈ N ) x∗i∈ arg min
xi
J¯i(xi, x
∗
−i), s.t. (xi, x
∗
−i) ∈ K
Assumption 1: For each player i, given any x−i, J¯i(xi, x−i) is
continuously differentiable and convex in xi and Ωi is a compact
convex set. The constraint set K is non-empty and satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification.
Assumption 1 is a standard assumption which ensures existence of a
generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE).
Given the optimization problem (1) over K for each agent i, let its
Lagrangian be defined as Li(xi, λi;x−i)= J¯i(xi, x−i) + λTi (Ax−
b), where A = [A1, . . . , AN ], b =
∑N
i=1 bi and the dual multiplier
is λi ∈ Rm+ . Then, the KKT conditions that an optimal solution x∗i
with λ∗i satisfies can be written as
0n ∈ ∇xi J¯i(x∗i , x∗−i) +ATi λ∗i +NΩi(x∗i )
0m ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) +NRm+ (λ
∗
i )
(2)
where ∇xi J¯i(xi, x−i)=∇xiJi(xi, σ(x)), with
∇xiJi(xi, σ(x))=∇xiJi(xi, y)|y=σ(x)+
1
N
∇yJi(xi, y)|y=σ(x).
and where NΩi is the normal cone operator.
By Theorem 8, §4 in [8] when (col(x∗i )i∈N , col(λ∗i )i∈N ) satisfies
(2) for all i ∈ N then x∗ is a GNE of the game. Given x∗ as a GNE
3of game, the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers may be different
for the players, i.e., λ∗1 6= λ∗2 6=, ..., 6= λ∗N . A GNE with the same
Lagrangian multiplier for all agents is called variational GNE, [8],
with the economic interpretation of no price discrimination and better
stability/sensitivity properties, [29]. A variational GNE of the game
is defined as x∗ ∈ K solution of the variational inequality V I(F,K):〈
F (x∗)
∣∣ x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K
where F denotes the pseudo-gradient of the game defined as
F (x) = col(∇xi J¯i(xi, x−i))i∈N = col(∇xiJi(xi, σ(x))i∈N , i.e.,
the stacked vector with the partial gradients for all i ∈ N . x∗ solves
V I(F,K) if and only if there exists a λ∗ ∈ Rm such that the KKT
conditions are satisfied, [9, §10.1],
0Nn ∈ F (x∗) +ATλ∗ +NΩ(x∗)
0m ∈ −(Ax∗ − b) +NRm+ (λ
∗) (3)
where NΩ(x
∗) =
∏N
i=1NΩi(x
∗
i ). Assumption 1 guarantees the
existence of a solution to V I(F,K), by [9, Corollary 2.2.5]. By
[8, Thm. 9, §4], every solution x∗ of V I(F,K) is a GNE of game.
Furthermore, if x∗ together with λ∗ satisfies the KKT conditions
(3) for V I(F,K) then x∗ satisfies the KKT conditions (2) with
λ∗1 = ...=λ∗N =λ
∗, hence x∗ is a variational GNE of game.
Given this aggregative game, our aim is to design a distributed
iterative algorithm that finds a variational GNE under partial-decision
information over a network.
Assumption 2: F is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous,
i.e., ∃µ > 0 and lF > 0 such that ∀x, x, 〈x−x | F (x)−F (x)〉 ≥
µ ‖x−x‖2, and ‖F (x)−F (x)‖≤ lF ‖x−x‖ .
Assumption 2 is commonly used in algorithms with fixed-step sizes,
[11], [12], [18]–[20], [30], [17], [23]–[26], [15], and guarantees that
a unique variational GNE exists, [9]. We consider that each agent
i does not have information on the other agents actions x−i or on
the aggregate value, σ(x), and that agents communicate only locally
with neighbouring agents, over a communication graph G.
Assumption 3: The communication graph G = (N , E) is undi-
rected and connected.
Remark 1: In the remainder of the paper, to simplify notation,
we assume that wij = 1, (i, j) ∈ E . The results can be extended
immediately to the case wij > 0, (i, j) ∈ E .
IV. DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
In this section we present our proposed algorithm. To offset the
lack of full information, each agent i maintains a local estimate ui
of the aggregate σ(x) and a local multiplier λi, and exchanges them
with its neighbours over G, in order to learn the true aggregate
value and the Lagrange multiplier λ∗. Each agent also maintains
an additional auxiliary variable zi, used for the coordination of the
coupling constraints and to reach consensus of the local multipliers.
Let (xi,k, ui,k, zi,k, λi,k) denote the tuple with agent i’s decision
variable xi,k, local aggregate estimate ui,k, local multiplier λi,k, and
auxiliary variable zi,k at iteration k, respectively. The goal is that over
time each agent will have the same aggregate estimate, equal to the
average of the agents actions, the same multiplier, and its decision
will correspond to a variational GNE with the coupled constraints
met. The proposed distributed algorithm is given below.
Algorithm 1:
xi,k+1 = PΩi [xi,k − τi(∇xiJi(xi,k, ui,k) +ATi λi,k
+c
∑
j∈Ni(ui,k − uj,k))]
ui,k+1 = ui,k − κc
∑
j∈Ni(ui,k − uj,k) + (xi,k+1 − xi,k)
zi,k+1 = zi,k + υi
∑
j∈Ni(λi,k − λj,k)
λi,k+1 =PRm+ (λi,k−αi[
∑
j∈Ni(λi,k−λj,k)+bi −Ai(2xi,k+1
−xi,k) +
∑
j∈Ni(2zi,k+1 − zi,k) − (2zj,k+1 − zj,k)])
where xi,0 ∈ Ωi, ui,0 = xi,0, zi,0, λi,0 ∈ Rm, ∀i ∈ N , c > 0
and τi, υi, αi, κ ∈ R++ are positive step sizes. Note that Algorithm
1 is fully distributed and instead of σ(x), each agent is using
ui (own estimate of the aggregate) to evaluate ∇xiJi(xi, ui) =
∇xiJi(xi, y)|y=ui+ 1N∇yJi(xi, y)|y=ui , its own partial gradient.
To write the algorithm more compactly, let xk=col(xi,k)i∈N ,uk=
col(ui,k)i∈N , zk = col(zi,k)i∈N , λk = col(λi,k)i∈N . Let F(x, u) =
col(∇xiJi(xi, ui))i∈N where ui ∈ Rn and u = col(ui)i∈N be the
extended pseudo-gradient. Note that when all ui=σ(x), F(x,1N ⊗
σ(x)=col(∇xiJi(xi, σ(x)))i∈N , hence
F(x,1N ⊗ σ(x))=F (x).
Thus, if in F (x) each agent is evaluating the gradient with the true
action aggregate value, in F(x, u) each agent is using instead its own
estimate of the aggregate, ui.
With these we can write Algorithm 1 compactly as,
xk+1 = PΩ[xk − τ(F(xk, uk) + ΛTλk+cLuuk)]
uk+1 = uk − κcLuuk + (xk+1 − xk)
zk+1 = zk + υLλλk
λk+1 = PRNm+
(
λk − α[Lλλk + b¯− Λ(2xk+1 − xk)
+Lλ(2zk+1 − zk)])
(4)
where x0 ∈ Ω ⊂ RNn, u0 = x0, z0 ∈ RNm, λ0 ∈ RNm+ ,
PΩ = col(PΩi)i∈N , PRNm+
= col(PRm+ )i∈N , Lu = L ⊗ In,
Lλ = L ⊗ Im, and L is the Laplacian matrix of the graph G,
Λ = diag(Ai)i∈N , b¯ = col(bi)i∈N , τ = diag(τi)i∈N ⊗ In,
υ = diag(υi)i∈N ⊗ Im, and α = diag(αi)i∈N ⊗ Im.
Remark 2: The algorithm is similar to the algorithm in [17] but it
is tailored for aggregative games. The update for xk is a projected-
gradient descent of the local Lagrangian function using player’s
aggregate estimate uk to evaluate the pseudo-gradient. Unlike [17],
here the estimate is separate from the action and needs to track the
aggregate of all actions. As a result, besides the consensus term it
has an additional correction term to account for the action’s effect
on the average. This acts as a dynamic-tracking term and, as shown
in the following, leads to an invariance property of the aggregate
estimate, which turns out to be critical for the convergence proof.
The auxiliary variable zk is updated by a discrete-time integration
for the multiplier consensual error. Lastly, the update for λk is a
combination of a projected-gradient ascent of the local Lagrangian
and a proportional-integral term for the multiplier consensus error.
We prove next the important invariance property that σ(uk) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ui,k (the average of all agents’ aggregate estimates) is
always equal to the actions’ true aggregate, σ(xk) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi,k.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then the following
properties hold for iterates xk, uk, zk, λk generated by Algorithm 1
or (4).
(i) 〈1N⊗In | uk〉= 〈1N⊗In | xk〉, hence σ(uk)=σ(xk), for all
k ≥ 0.
(ii) Any fixed point (x, u, z, λ) of Algorithm 1 is such ui = σ(x),
λi = λ
∗ for all i ∈ N , where x = x∗ and λ∗ satisfy (3), and x∗ is
a variational GNE.
Proof: See Appendix.
We exploit the invariance in Lemma 1(i) and, from (4), we next
construct an auxiliary iteration with respect to the consensus subspace
of the aggregate estimates, which will prove instrumental for the
convergence analysis. Let C denote the n-dimensional consensus
subspace for all agents’ aggregate estimates, i.e., C = {u | u =
1N ⊗ c, c ∈ Rn} and let C⊥ be its orthogonal complement. Note
that C = Null(Lu) = Range(1N ⊗In) and C⊥ = Range(Lu) =
Null(1TN ⊗ In). Any u ∈ RNn can be decomposed as u =
P||u + P⊥u, where P||u ∈ C and P⊥u ∈ C⊥, by using the
4projection matrices P|| = 1N 1N1
T
N ⊗ In = 1N 1N ⊗ 1TN ⊗ In
and P⊥ = INn − P||. Note that P||u = 1N ⊗ σ(u), where
σ(u) = 1N (1
T
N ⊗ In)u.
Any uk generated by (4) can be decomposed as uk = P||uk +
P⊥uk where, by using the invariance property in Lemma 1(i),
P||uk = 1N ⊗ σ(uk) = P||xk ∀k ≥ 0. (5)
Using this decomposition together with (4), consider:
xk+1 = PΩ[xk − τ(F(xk, P||xk + u⊥k ) + ΛTλk+cLuu⊥k )]
u⊥k+1 = u
⊥
k − κcLuu⊥k + P⊥(xk+1 − xk)
zk+1 = zk + υLλλk
λk+1 = PRNm+
(
λk − α[Lλλk + b¯− Λ(2xk+1 − xk)
+Lλ(2zk+1 − zk)])
(6)
where x0 ∈ Ω, u⊥0 = P⊥x0, z0 ∈ RNm,λ0 ∈ RNm+ . The next result
relates precisely iterates generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) to iterates
generated by (6).
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then, any sequence
{xk, uk, zk, λk} generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) with initial con-
ditions x0, u0 = x0, z0, λ0 can be derived from some sequence
{x′k, u
′⊥
k , z
′
k, λ
′
k} generated by (6) with initial conditions x′0 =
x0, u
′⊥
0 =P⊥x0, z′0 =z0, λ′0 =λ0, as in
xk=x
′
k, uk=P||x
′
k+u
′⊥
k , zk=z
′
k, λk=λ
′
k. (7)
Proof: The proof follows an induction argument. Due to the initial
conditions, P||x′0+u
′⊥
0 = P||x0+P⊥x0 =x0 =u0, hence (7) holds
for k = 0.
Suppose (7) holds at step k. Then, from z′k+1 = z
′
k+υLλλ
′
k (cf.
(6)) with z′k = zk, λ
′
k = λk, it follows that z
′
k+1 = zk +υLλλk
hence by the z-update in (4), z′k+1 =zk+1. Next, using (7) into the
right-hand side of the x′-update in (6), yields cf. (4),
x′k+1 =PΩ[x
′
k−τ(F(x′k, P||x′k+u
′⊥
k )
+ ΛTλ′k+cLuu
′⊥
k )] (8)
=PΩ[xk−τ(F(xk,uk)+ΛTλk+cLuuk)]
= xk+1.
Hence the first and third relations in (7) hold at step k+1, and using
them on the right-hand side of the λ′-update in (6) yields λ′k+1 =
λk+1, where λk+1 is generated by (4).
Lastly, we show the second relation in (7) at step k+1. Thus,
P||x
′
k+1+u
′⊥
k+1 =P||xk+1+u
′⊥
k −κcLuu
′⊥
k +P⊥(x
′
k+1−x′k)
=P||xk+1+uk−P||xk−κcLu(uk−P||xk)+P⊥(xk+1−xk),
where we used relations for x at step k + 1 cf. (8) and for u
′⊥ at
step k cf. (7). Using P||xk+P⊥xk = xk, LuP||xk = 0 it follows
that P||x′k+1 +u
′⊥
k+1 =uk−κcLuuk+(xk+1−xk) = uk+1, cf. the
u-update in (4), and the argument is complete. 
Lemma 2 is instrumental in what follows. Based on it, convergence
of Algorithm 1 or (4) can be established once convergence of (6) is
shown. Note that any u⊥k generated by (6) is such that u
⊥
k ∈ C⊥, for
all k ≥ 0. We show next that (6) can be written as a preconditioned
forward-backward iteration,
02N(n+m) ∈ A$k + B$k+1 + Φ($k+1 −$k) (9)
where $ = (x, u⊥, z, λ) ∈ RNn×C⊥×RNm×RNm+ , for two
operators A and B and matrix Φ defined as,
A : $ 7→

F(x, P||x+u⊥)
cLuu
⊥
0Nm
Lλλ+ b¯

B : $ 7→

NΩ(x)
0Nn
0Nm
NRNm+ (λ)
+

0 0 0 ΛT
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −Lλ
−Λ 0 Lλ 0
$
Φ =

τ−1+κ−1P⊥ −κ−1P⊥ 0 −ΛT
−κ−1P⊥ κ−1INn 0 0
0 0 υ−1 Lλ
−Λ 0 Lλ α−1

(10)
where 0 is an all-zero matrix of appropriate dimension.
Lemma 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold and let $k =
col(xk, u
⊥
k , zk, λk), A, B and Φ be defined as in (10). Suppose that
Φ  0 and Φ−1B is maximally monotone. Then the following hold:
(i): Iterates (6) are equivalently written as (9), i.e.,
$k+1 = (Id + Φ
−1B)−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1A)$k = T2 ◦ T1$k (11)
where T2 = (Id + Φ−1B)−1 and T1 = Id− Φ−1A.
(ii) Any fixed point of (6) is a zero of A+B and a fixed point of
T2 ◦T1. Furthermore, any such point $¯ = col(x¯, u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯) satisfies
x¯=x∗, u¯⊥=0Nn, λ¯=1N⊗λ∗, where x∗ and λ∗ satisfy the KKT
conditions (3), hence x∗ is a variational GNE.
Proof: (i) The equivalence for u⊥k+1, zk+1, and λk+1 between (9)
and (6) can be shown by expanding (9) with A, B and Φ as in (10),
cancelling terms. Similarly, for the xk+1 update, by expanding (9),
replacing the u⊥k+1 term with u
⊥
k − κcLuu⊥k +P⊥(xk+1 − xk) cf.
(6), using P⊥P⊥ = P⊥, cancelling terms and using τ−1NΩ(x) =
NΩ(x), PΩ =(Id+NΩ)
−1 yields (6). Since Φ0 by assumption,
(9) is equivalent to (Id−Φ−1A)($k)∈(Id+Φ−1B)($k+1), which
can be written as (11), based on the fact that (Id + Φ−1B)−1 is
singled-valued (cf. [28, Prop. 23.7] by Φ−1B maximally monotone).
(ii): Let $¯ = col(x¯, u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯) be the fixed point of (6) or (9),
hence is a fixed point of T2 ◦ T1. By continuity, the following
equivalences hold, $¯ = (Id + Φ−1B)−1 ◦ (Id − Φ−1A)$¯ ⇔
(Id+Φ−1B)($¯) ∈ (Id−Φ−1A)($¯)⇔ 02N(n+m) ∈ (B+A)($¯).
Thus, using (10), it follows that $¯ = col(x¯, u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯) satisfies:
0Nn∈NΩ(x¯)+F(x¯, P||x¯+u¯⊥)+ΛT λ¯, 0Nn=Luu¯⊥, 0Nm=Lλλ¯,
and 0Nm ∈ NRNm+ (λ¯) +Lλλ¯+ b¯−Λx¯+Lλz¯. By Assumption
3, the second and third relations imply that u¯⊥ = 0Nm (since
u¯⊥ ∈ C⊥) and λ¯ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, for a λ∗ ∈ Rm. Using these in
the first and fourth relations together with P||x¯ = 1N ⊗ σ(x¯),
leads to 0Nn ∈ NΩ(x¯) + F(x¯,1N ⊗ σ(x¯)) + ATλ∗ which, using
F(x¯,1N ⊗ σ(x¯) = F (x¯), is the first relation in (3). From 0Nm ∈
NRNm+
(1N ⊗λ∗)+b¯−Λx¯+Lλz¯, premultiplying by (1T⊗Im) as in
the proof of Lemma 1(ii), the second one in (3)holds, so x¯ = x∗ is
a variational GNE. 
Remark 3: Lemma 2 and 3 show that Algorithm 1 is related to a
forward-backward iteration (9) or (11), [28], with a preconditioning
matrix Φ. The symmetric matrix Φ is needed, as pointed out in
[26] and [17], to be able to distribute the backward step. Our proof
techniques are similar to those in [17], however, the operators A and
B are slightly different, while the metric matrix Φ has a different
structure, with a new block involving the projection matrix P⊥ which
needs handled separately. One of the reasons is that in the general
setup in [17] the action is part of the estimate vector, while in our
setup the actions and the aggregate estimate are separate and only
consensus on the aggregate is needed.
5V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section we show convergence of Algorithm 1. Based on
Lemma 2 its convergence can be established once convergence of
(6) is shown. In turn, (6) is equivalent to (9) or (11), (cf. Lemma
3). Convergence of iteration (11) is guaranteed when Φ−1A is a
cocoercive and Φ−1B is a monotone operator, cf. Theorem 25.8 in
[28]. However, A is defined in terms of the extended pseudo-gradient
F for which monotonicity properties are not guaranteed to hold on
the augmented space of actions and aggregate estimates (only strong
monotonicity of F (x) is assumed). Instead, we will show that A
satisfies a restrictive cocoercive property and that B is maximally
monotone, and then similar properties for Φ−1A and Φ−1B. This
turns out to be sufficient to prove convergence because the restrictive
property is with respect to the aggregate consensus subspace where
the zeros of A + B lie, cf. Lemma 3(ii). To show the restrictive
cocoercive property of A we balance the strong monotonicity of
the pseudo-gradient F (x) (on the aggregate consensus subspace C)
with that of the Laplacian on its orthogonal component C⊥, under a
Lipschitz assumption on the extended pseudo-gradient F(x, u).
Assumption 4: The extended pseudo-gradient F(x,u) is Lipschitz
continuous in both arguments, i.e., ∃luF>0, lxF>0 s.t.
‖F(x, u)− F(x, u)‖ ≤ luF ‖u− u‖ ∀x, u, u ∈ RNn,
‖F(x, u)− F(x, u)‖ ≤ lxF ‖x− x‖ ∀x, x, u ∈ RNn.
Assumption 4 is not restrictive and is also used in other distributed
(G)NE algorithms over networks, e.g. [11], [24], [15]. A sufficient
condition for it to hold is that F is C1 with bounded Jacobian. For
quadratic games, it is automatically satisfied.
The following lemma establishes a (restricted) monotonicity prop-
erty on part of the A operator, (10), denoted A˜.
Lemma 4: Let A˜ be defined as,
A˜ : (x, u⊥) 7→
[
F(x, P||x+ u⊥)
cLuu
⊥
]
(12)
where (x, u⊥)∈RNn×C⊥. Suppose that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold.
Then, for any (x, u⊥) and any (x, u⊥) with u⊥ = 0Nn,〈[
x− x
u⊥ − u⊥
] ∣∣∣∣ A˜(x, u⊥)−A˜(x, u⊥)〉≥µA˜ ∥∥∥∥ x− xu⊥ − u⊥
∥∥∥∥2 (13)
where
µA˜ = λmin
([
µ
−luF
2−luF
2 cλ2(L)
])
.
Furthermore, A˜ is restricted monotone if cλ2(L) ≥ (l
u
F )
2
4µ and
strongly monotone if the inequality is strict.
Proof: With A˜ as in (12), for any (x,u⊥), (x, u⊥) withu⊥=0Nn,
the left-hand side of (13) is written as〈[
x− x
u⊥ − u⊥
] ∣∣∣∣ A˜(x, u⊥)−A˜(x, u⊥)〉 (14)
=
〈
x−x
∣∣∣F(x,P||x+u⊥)〉−〈x−x ∣∣∣F(x,P||x)〉
+
〈
u⊥−u⊥
∣∣∣cLu(u⊥−u⊥)〉+〈x−x ∣∣∣F(x,P||x)〉−〈x−x ∣∣∣F(x,P||x)〉.
Note that
〈
x−x
∣∣∣F(x,P||x)−F(x,P||x)〉 ≥ µ ‖x−x‖2 , by
F(x,P||x)=F(x,1N⊗σ(x))=F (x) and Assumption 2. Also,〈
x−x
∣∣∣F(x,P||x+u⊥)−F(x,P||x)〉≥−luF ∥∥∥u⊥−u⊥∥∥∥‖x−x‖ ,
by Assumption 4. Since u⊥∈C⊥, u⊥=0Nn,〈
u⊥−u⊥
∣∣∣ cLu(u⊥−u⊥)〉≥ cλ2(L)∥∥∥u⊥−u⊥∥∥∥2 ,
by Assumption 3. Using these inequalities into (14) yields
〈[
x− x
u⊥ − u⊥
] ∣∣∣∣ A˜(x, u⊥)−A˜(x, u⊥)〉
≥
[
‖x− x‖
∥∥∥u⊥ − u⊥∥∥∥] [ µ −luF2−luF
2 cλ2(L)
][ ‖x− x‖∥∥∥u⊥ − u⊥∥∥∥
]
from which (13) follows. 
Remark 4: The condition cλ2(L)>
(luF )
2
4µ in Lemma 4 is critical
to ensure the restricted monotonicity of A˜ and the convergence of
the proposed method, and the parameter c provides the extra degree
of freedom to satisfy it. Lemma 4 shows that A˜ is monotone when
restricted to a subspace where u⊥ = 0Nn, i.e., when u = u|| ∈ C.
This means that restricted monotonicity is with respect to the n-
dimensional aggregate consensus subspace (independent of N ). This
is unlike [17] where the restricted monotonicity is with respect to
the Nn-dimensional consensus subspace (cf. Lemma 3 in [17]). In
fact, the bound in (13) is tighter than the one in Lemma 3 in [17] (or
Theorem 5 in [14]) and does not depend on N (number of agents).
We emphasize that we are able to obtain this better bound due to the
invariance property of the aggregate estimate. The invariance property
is induced by the extra term in the aggregate estimate update in
Algorithm 1, that is not present in the algorithm in [17].
Using the fact that A˜ is restricted monotone we can now show
properties for the operators A and B, (10).
Lemma 5: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 4 hold and cλ2(L)>
(luF)
2
4µ .
Then the following hold for operators A and B, (10).
(i) B is maximally monotone.
(ii) A is β-restricted cocoercive: for any $=(x, u⊥, z, λ) with u⊥∈
C⊥ and any $=(x, u⊥, z, λ) with u⊥=0Nn, the following holds
〈$ −$ | A$ −A$〉 ≥ β ‖A$ −A$‖2
where β=min{µA˜
θ2
, 1
λN (L)
}, θ2=max{(lxF )2,(luF )2+(cλN (L))2}.
Proof: (i): B is written as the sum of two operators, one being
a Cartesian product of normal cone operators, hence maximally
monotone operator, and the other one being a skew-symmetric matrix,
hence also maximally monotone, with full domain. Thus B itself is
maximally monotone, [28].
(ii): Let $=(x, u⊥, z, λ), $=(x, u⊥, z, λ) and A˜ (12). Then
〈$−$ | A$−A$〉=
〈[
x− x
u⊥ − u⊥
] ∣∣∣∣ A˜(x, u⊥)−A˜(x, u⊥)〉
+ 〈λ− λ | Lλ(λ− λ)〉 (15)
Using (13) and 〈λ−λ | Lλ(λ−λ)〉 ≥ 1λN (L) ‖Lλ(λ−λ)‖
2 for the
second term, it follows that for any u⊥∈C⊥ and u⊥=0Nn,
〈$−$ | A$−A$〉≥µA˜
∥∥∥∥[ x− xu⊥−u⊥
]∥∥∥∥2+ 1λN (L) ‖Lλ(λ−λ)‖2 .
On the other hand, using A˜ as in (12), Lipschitz properties of F,
bounds on the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix L, we obtain∥∥∥A˜(x, u⊥)− A˜(x, u⊥)∥∥∥2 ≤ θ2 ∥∥∥∥[ x− xu⊥ − u⊥
]∥∥∥∥2
where θ2=max{(lxF)2,(luF)2+(cλN (L))2}. Using this in the forego-
ing leads to the inequality in (ii). 
The following lemma shows how agents can select step sizes
independently such that Φ  0.
Lemma 6: Given any δ > 0 and κ < 1δ , if step sizes are selected
such that
τi ≤ 1
maxj=1,...,n{
∑m
k=1 |[ATi ]jk|}+ δ + 1κ(1−κδ)
υi ≤ (2di + δ)−1
αi ≤ ( max
j=1,...,m
{
n∑
k=1
|[Ai]jk|}+ 2di + δ)−1
6where di = |Ni|, then the matrix Φ− δI  0 and Φ  0.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The next result shows that Φ−1B and Φ−1A satisfy a monotonicity
property in the Φ-induced norm.
Lemma 7: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 4 hold and cλ2(L)>
(luF )
2
4µ .
Take any δ > 12β where β is from Lemma 5, κ<
1
δ and step sizes
τi, υi and αi chosen to satisfy Lemma 6. Then under the Φ-induced
norm ‖·‖Φ the following hold:
(i) Φ−1B is maximally monotone and T2 =(I+Φ−1B)−1∈A(12).
(ii) Φ−1A is βδ-restricted cocoercive and T1 = Id − Φ−1A is
restricted nonexpansive and furthermore, the following holds for any
$ = (x, u⊥, z, λ) and any $ = (x,0Nn, z, λ),
‖T1$−T1$‖2Φ≤‖$−$‖2Φ
−(2βδ−1) ‖$−$−(T1$−T1$)‖2Φ.
Proof: The proof is based on properties of A and B in Lemma 5,
Φ  0 by Lemma 6 and resolvent properties for maximally monotone
operators, [28], similar to Lemma 7 in [26] and Lemma 6 in [17] and
is omitted, due to space constraints. 
After establishing these properties on operators A and B, we show
next convergence to the variational GNE.
Theorem 1: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 4 hold and cλ2(L)>
(luF)
2
4µ .
Take any δ > 12β , where β is as in Lemma 5, κ <
1
δ and step
sizes τi, υi and αi chosen to satisfy Lemma 6. Then the action
xi,k of each player i ∈ N generated by Algorithm 1 converges to
the corresponding component in the GNE x∗, all agents’ aggregate
estimates ui,k converge to the same value σ(x
∗) (true aggregate) for
all i ∈ N , all agent’s local multipliers λi,k converge to the same
multiplier λ∗ for all i ∈ N , corresponding to the KKT condition (3).
Proof: Lemma 2 shows that any sequence {xk, uk, zk, λk}
generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) can be obtained by some se-
quence {xk, u⊥k , zk, λk} generated by (6), via uk = P||xk + u⊥k ,
cf. (7). Thus, if we show that any sequence {xk, u⊥k , zk, λk} of
(6) converges to (x¯, u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯), then convergence of any sequence
{xk, uk, zk, λk} of Algorithm 1 follows, and moreover, by (7), its
limit is (x¯,P||x¯+u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯), where P||x¯=1N⊗σ(x¯).
To show convergence of {xk, u⊥k , zk, λk} recall that, by Lemma
3(i), we can write any $k = (xk, u
⊥
k , zk, λk) of (6) as $k+1 =
T2 ◦ T1$k, where T1 = Id − Φ−1A and T2 = (Id + Φ−1B)−1
and, by Lemma 3(ii), any fixed point (x¯, u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯) is a fixed point
of T2◦T1 and satisfies u¯⊥ = 0Nn. By Lemma 7, T1 is restricted
nonexpansive and the inequality in Lemma 7(ii) holds with respect
to the consensus subspace where u¯⊥ = 0Nn, and T2 ∈ A( 12 ). Thus
operators T1 and T2 satisfy restricted average properties as in Lemma
6 in [17]. Then, using an argument as in the proof of Theorem 25.8
in [28] for averaged operators (see proof of Theorem 2 in [17]), it
follows that any sequence {$k} = {(xk, u⊥k , zk, λk)} converges
to $¯ = (x¯, u¯⊥, z¯, λ¯) a fixed-point of T2 ◦ T1, which by Lemma
3(ii), satisfies x¯ = x∗, u¯⊥ = 0Nn, λ¯ = 1N ⊗λ∗, where x∗ is the
variational GNE and λ∗ the corresponding multiplier. By Lemma
2, any {xk, uk, zk, λk} generated by Algorithm 1 or (4) converges,
and, by (7), its limit is (x∗,1N⊗ σ(x∗), z¯,1N⊗ λ∗), hence {xk}
converges to x∗, the variational GNE. 
Remark 5: Given a globally known c such that cλ2(L)>
(luF)
2
4µ , δ
(depending on β as in Lemma 5) and κ, players can independently
select step sizes τi, υi, αi to satisfy the upper bounds in Lemma
6. The result in Theorem 1 provides conditions for distributed con-
vergence of the GNE seeking algorithm on a single time-scale. This
is more challenging to establish than in a semi-decentralized setting
where the true aggregate is provided by a coordinator. In a distributed
setting, when each agent updates action and estimates the aggregate
simultaneously, effectively each has to track the changing aggregate
(which depends on the other agents’ changing actions) while also
updating its own action. Herein, we achieve distributed convergence
on a single time-scale by using operator-splitting techniques and
balancing the lack of monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient off the
consensus subspace with monotonicity of the Laplacian.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we consider a Nash-Cournot game over a network,
as in [14] [11] [24], for a single market with production constraints
and globally coupling market capacity constraints, where N = 20,
Ωi = [0, 10] ∀i ∈ N , A = 1T , b = 20. The cost function
for each agent is Ji(xi, x−i) = ci(xi)−xifi(x), where ci(xi) =
[1+2(i−1)]xi is the production cost and fi(x)=60− σ(x)− 12xi
is the demand price. The variational GNE is on the boundary at
x∗ = [7.809..., 5.904..., 4, 2.095..., 0.190..., 0, . . . , 0]T . For this
cost function luF = 1, l
x
F = 1. We compare the results with those of
the algorithm in [24], in which each agent performs ν communication
rounds to update the local multiplier, then updates its action, followed
by another ν communication rounds to update its aggregate estimate.
The algorithm in [24] converges to an -GNE, which approaches
the variational GNE if ν goes to infinity. For simulation we chose
ν = 200 and step size τ = 0.01, which means that there are 400
communication rounds before an action update, unlike Algorithm 1
where only 2 are needed. We compare them for a star and for a ring
communication network topology, respectively. All initial conditions
are set to 0. For Algorithm 1 we set the weighted adjacency matrix,
wij =1 if (i, j)∈E , while for the algorithm [24] the mixing matrix
is Wmix=I− 120L (star graph) and Wmix=I− 13L (ring graph).
A. Star Communication Graph
For a star communication graph topology λ2(L)=1 and λN (L)=
20, and we can use c = 0.5 in Lemma 4, which yields µA˜ = 0.2,
β−1 = 528.8, δ > 12β = 264. We set δ = 300, κ
−1 = 500, for
which the bounds on the step sizes in Lemma 6 are τ−1i ≥ 1806.6,
υ−1i ≥284.4, α−1i ≥285.4. Although the step sizes can be different
for each agent, for simplicity they are taken to be the same: τ−1i =
2000, υ−1i =300=α
−1
i . The agents’ production plots are shown in 1
for Algorithm 1 and in 2 for the algorithm in [24], respectively, where
the x-axis shows the communication iterations. In the plots above the
variational GNE components are denoted by stars on the y-axis to the
right. In 3 we compare the normalized error, ‖x− x∗‖ / ‖x∗‖ 100%
of agents’ actions from the variational GNE for the two algorithms.
We see that the algorithm in [24] converges to an -GNE (if ν is taken
larger, one can get arbitrary close to the true GNE). We note that
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Fig. 1: Production of agents, Algorithm 1, Star topology
in most cases the number of communications is the most important,
but there may be situations where communications are cheap and
number of action updates might be more relevant. In 4 we plot the
evolution of production for algorithm [24], where this time the x-axis
counts the number of action updates. Thus, every action iteration
in 4 corresponds to 400 communication iterations (ν = 200). The
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Fig. 2: Production of agents, Algorithm [24], Star topology
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Fig. 3: Normalized error from the variational GNE, star topology.
Algorithm 1 (blue), algorithm [24] (orange)
variational GNE components are denoted by stars on the y-axis to
the right. The plots for Algorithm 1 versus number of action updates
look similar to those in 1 (2 communications/action update) and we
omit them.
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Fig. 4: Production of agents, Algorithm [24], Star topology
B. Ring Communication Graph
For a ring communication graph λ2(L)=0.1 and λN (L)=4, we
use c = 4 which yields µA˜ = 0.1, β
−1 = 2326, δ > 12β = 1162.
We set δ = 1200, κ−1 = 2000, for which the bounds on the step
sizes in Lemma 6 are τ−1i ≥7942.5, υ−1i ≥1166.9, α−1i ≥1167.9.
For simplicity the step sizes are taken to be the same: τ−1i = 8000,
υ−1i = 1200 = α
−1
i . The agents’ production plots are shown in 5
for Algorithm 1 and in 6 for the algorithm in [24], where the x-axis
counts the number of communications. 7 compares the normalized
error, ‖x− x∗‖ / ‖x∗‖ 100% from the variational GNE for the two
algorithms. Compared to the star topology, it can be seen that
convergence is slower. Thus convergence is affected by the network
topology, (lower connectivity leads to slower convergence). On the
other hand, we note that the bounds on the step sizes in Lemma
6 are conservative. In 8 we plot the normalized error results when
Algorithm 1 is run with ten times larger step sizes, indicating fast
convergence to the variational GNE.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a distributed algorithm that globally
converges to a variational GNE in aggregative games with affine
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Fig. 5: Production of agents, Algorithm 1, ring topology
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Fig. 6: Production of agents, Algorithm [24], ring topology
coupling constraints. The algorithm employs simultaneous action and
aggregate estimate update, based on local communication, and uses
fixed-step sizes. We proved its convergence by forward-backward
operator splitting for two preconditioned operators. We specifically
exploited the invariance of the estimate average to show that the op-
erators are restricted monotone. As future directions we can mention
extension to time-varying and directed communication graphs.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) Note that from (4), using 〈1N⊗In |Lu〉=
0TNn, it follows that 〈1N⊗In | uk+1〉 = 〈1N⊗In | uk〉 −
〈1N⊗In | xk〉+ 〈1N⊗In | xk+1〉, for all k ≥ 0. Since u0 = x0,
the first claim follows by induction, and the second one follows by
using σ(uk)=
1
N (1
T
N⊗In)uk, σ(xk)= 1N (1TN⊗In)xk.
(ii) Let (x, u, z, λ) be a fixed point of Algorithm 1 or (4). Then,
z = z+υLλλ, i.e., Lλλ = 0Nm which, by Assumption 3 implies
that λi=λ∗ for all i ∈ N , for some λ∗∈Rm. From the update for
uk in (4) if follows that u=u−κcLuu+(x−x), i.e., Luu=0Nn
which by Assumption 3 implies that ui=u for all i ∈ N , for some
u ∈ Rn, hence σ(u) = u. Using part (i) it follows that u = σ(x),
i.e., in steady-state all agents have the same estimate equal to the
action aggregate value. From the update of xk in (4) it follows that
x=PΩ[x−τ(F(x, u)+ΛTλ)], using the fact that Luu=0Nn. With
PΩ = (Id+NΩ)
−1, this yields 0Nn ∈ τ−1NΩ(x)+F(x, u)+ΛTλ,
where NΩ(x) = Π
N
i=1NΩi(xi). Since τi> 0, τ
−1NΩ(x) =NΩ(x),
and with ui=σ(x), λi = λ∗, ∀i ∈ N , this yields component-wise,
0n ∈ ∇xiJi(xi, σ(x))+ATi λ∗+NΩi(xi), i ∈ N , which is the first
KKT condition, (3). From the update for λk in (4) it follows that,
λ = PRNm+
(
λ− α[Lλλ+ b¯− Λ(2x− x) + Lλ(2z − z)]
)
, which
with λi = λ∗, ∀i ∈ N , leads to 0Nm ∈ NRNm+ (1N ⊗λ
∗)− (Λx−
b¯−Lλz), or 0Nm = v∗−(Λx−b¯−Lλz), for some v∗ = col(v∗i )i∈N
with v∗i ∈ NRm+ (λ
∗), ∀i ∈ N . Premultiplying by (1TN ⊗ Im) and
using (1TN ⊗In)Lλ = 0TNm (by Assumption 3) and (1TN ⊗Im)Λ =
A, (1TN ⊗ Im)b¯ = b, yields 0m =
∑N
i=1 v
∗
i − (Ax − b), or 0m ∈∑N
i=1NRm+ (λ
∗)−(Ax − b), i.e., 0m ∈ NRm+ (λ
∗)−(Ax − b) (by
Corollary 16.39 in [28]), which gives the second KKT condition, (3).
Therefore, x=x∗ is a variational GNE and λ∗ its multiplier. 
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Fig. 7: Normalized error from the variational GNE, ring topology.
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Fig. 8: Normalized error from the variational GNE, ring topology.
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Proof of Lemma 6 The proof is based on the Schur complement
and a diagonal dominance argument. Firstly, given any δ>0, κ< 1δ ,
let the step sizes τi be selected as in the statement, and let τ˜
−1
i =
τ−1i −δ− 1κ(1−κδ) , or in vector form, τ˜−1 =τ−1−(δ+ 1κ(1−κδ) )INn,
where τ˜=diag(τ˜i)i∈N ⊗ In. Using τ−1 =(δ+ 1κ(1−κδ) )INn+τ˜−1
in Φ (10) we can write Φ−δI=Φ1+Φ2 where
Φ1 =

1
κ(1−κδ)INn + κ
−1P⊥ −P⊥κ−1 0 0
−κ−1P⊥ (κ−1−δ)INn 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

Φ2 =

τ˜−1 0 0 −ΛT
0 0 0 0
0 0 υ−1 − δINm Lλ
−Λ 0 Lλ α−1 − δINm

and 0 is an all-zero matrix of appropriate dimension.
Since κ−1−δ > 0, using Schur’s complement, the top-left block
matrix in Φ1 is positive semi-definite if
1
κ(1−κδ)INn + κ
−1P⊥−P⊥κ−1(κ−1−δ)−1κ−1P⊥0
or, equivalently, if κ−1P⊥+ 1κ(1−κδ) (INn−P⊥P⊥)  0, which holds
since P⊥ is a projection matrix. Thus Φ1 is positive semi-definite.
By Ghershgorin’s theorem, a sufficient condition for Φ2 to be
positive semi-definite is to be diagonally dominant, i.e.,
τ˜−1i ≥ maxj=1,...,n{
∑m
k=1 |[ATi ]jk|}
ν−1i − δ ≥
∑m
j=1 |Lij | = 2di
σ−1i − δ ≥ maxj=1,...,m{
∑n
k=1 |[Ai]jk|}+
∑m
j=1 |Lij |
= maxj=1,...,m{
∑n
k=1 |[Ai]jk|}+ 2di
(16)
for all i ∈N . Since τ˜−1i = τ−1i −δ − 1κ(1−κδ) , if τi νi and αi are
selected as in the lemma statement, it follows that all inequalities in
(16) hold, hence Φ2 is positive semi-definite. Thus, Φ−δI is positive
semi-definite, and therefore Φ is positive definite. 
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